HUBUNGAN KEBIJAKAN HUTANG, INSIDER OWNERSHIP DAN KEBIJAKAN DIVIDEN DALAM MEKANISME PENGAWASAN MASALAH AGENSI
Abstract: This study
investigates the substitution relationship (substitutability) among debt
policy, insider ownership, and dividend policy as the agency problem control
mechanism in Indonesia. If the substitution relationship exists among the
agency control mechanisms, the agency problem can be reduced through this
relationship. Reducing the agency problem as a result can increase the firm
value proxied by Tobin’s Q. This study employs 69 firms listed on Jakarta Stock
Exchange from 2001 to 2004. The results of this study indicate that the
substitutability among debt policy, insider ownership, and dividend policy as
agency problem control mechanism does not exist effectively in Indonesia.
Actually, there is substitutability relationship among the control mechanisms,
but it is not effective.
Keywords: Insider ownership,
debt policy, dividend policy, agency problem, substitutability
Penulis: D. Agus Harjito,
Nurfauziah
Kode Jurnal: jpakuntansidd060013
