KEBIJAKAN DIVIDEN PADA PERUSAHAAN YANG DIKENDALIKAN OLEH PEMEGANG SAHAM PENGENDALI
ABSTRACT: The primarily agency
problem for firms with ownership concentration is the conflict between
controlling and minority shareholders. The concentration of corporate control
in the hands of controlling shareholder creates powerful incentives and ability
to expropriate minority shareholders. This paper is aimed to examine the evidence
on expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholder
through dividend payment. By using sample consists of firms listed in the
Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period from 2000 to 2005, this paper proves
that controlling shareholder expropriate minority shareholders through dividend
policy. Moreover, when control rights exceed cash flow rights, the controlling
shareholder has higher inventive to expropriate by participating in firm’s
management. The Cash flow rights,
however, are important incentive sources to avoid expropriation.
Keywords: expropriation,
dividend, controlling share-holder, ultimate ownership, immediate ownership,
cash flow right, control right, cash flow right leverage
Penulis: Baldric Siregar
Kode Jurnal: jpmanajemendd110173
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