UTANG DAN DIVERGENSI HAK KONTROL DARI HAK ALIRAN KAS
ABSTRACT: This paper examines
the leverage of firms with agency problems associated with the divergence in
the con-trolling shareholders’ control and cash-flow rights. Previous studies
suggest that, when control rights separated from cash flow rights, debt can
serve as a mechanism allowing controlling shareholders to exploit minority
shareholders. Based on the collected sample of listed firms traded in the
Indonesia Stock Exchanges, the paper examines the issue. In this study, be
found that firms with higher divergence in control and cash-flow rights use
significantly more debt financing. More-over, controlling shareholders who have
the divergence and participate in management as well tend to use more leverage
to expropriate other shareholders.
Keywords: expropriation,
leverage, controlling share-holder, ultimate ownership, immediate ownership,
cash flow rights, control rights, cash flow right leverage
Penulis: Baldric Siregar
Kode Jurnal: jpmanajemendd100144
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